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SUPPORT FOR BUSINESS R&D
IN BUDGET 2012: TWO STEPS
FORWARD AND ONE BACK
John Lester†
SUMMARY
The federal budget contains some sensible changes to the SR&ED investment tax
credit, but the decision to reduce support for large firms to provide additional
support for small firms is a step in the wrong direction. The Jenkins Panel*
expressed concern about excessive subsidization of small and medium-sized firms
and recommended cutting back on the enhanced SR&ED credit in order to finance
more targeted support for these firms. Following that advice would have improved
the social return on support for R&D; in contrast, the budget measures marginally
reduce the benefits to society from subsidizing R&D. 
The budget also announced $400 million in additional funding for risk capital.
Returns in the venture capital industry are very low and the additional funding is
unlikely to be successfully deployed until returns improve. There is abundant
evidence that the tax credit for investment in Labour-Sponsored Venture Capital
Corporations is crowding out private investment and contributing to low rates of
return; eliminating the credit is therefore an essential first step in restoring the
financial health of the venture capital industry.
† John Lester is a Research Fellow with The School of Public Policy, University of Calgary.  
The author wishes to acknowledge the helpful comments of Bev Dahlby, Jacek Warda and an
anonymous referee.
* More formally known as the Expert Review Panel on Support to Federal R&D, the Panel
was chaired by Tom Jenkins, Executive Chairman and Chief Strategy Officer, Open Text
Corporation. The Panel was set up in October 2010 with a mandate to review the effectiveness
of federal R&D support programs, to assess the mix and design of these programs and to
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LESS SUPPORT FOR LARGE FIRMS
The Scientific Research and Experimental (SR&ED) tax incentive provides a 20 percent
investment tax credit for most firms conducting eligible R&D, and a 35 percent refundable
credit for small to medium-sized Canadian-controlled private corporations. Budget 2012
reduces the generosity of the SR&ED tax incentive by lowering the regular credit from 20 to
15 percent and by tightening up the treatment of contracts and overhead payments, as well as
by eliminating capital spending from the base for calculating the credit. These measures will
reduce SR&ED claims by about $500 million within five years, with about 80 percent of the
savings coming from large firms (Table 1). Increased funding for direct assistance programs
will amount to about $150 million by fiscal year 2016-7, with almost all of the benefits
accruing to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). 
The rationale given in the budget for reducing the regular credit is that corporate income tax
rate reductions have increased the relative generosity of the SR&ED tax incentive program and
resulted in growing pools of unused credits. The tax credit has indeed become larger relative to
the tax liabilities of the typical large firm undertaking R&D, but the economic case for
supporting R&D is independent of the taxable income of firms. Governments subsidize R&D
because not all of the benefits of undertaking R&D are captured by the firms making the
investment; some benefits spill over to the broader economy, so public support for R&D can
benefit all citizens, not just the recipients of the subsidy. The subsidy rate that maximizes the
net public benefit (the optimal rate) depends on the size of these spillover benefits and the cost
of delivering the assistance; the tax status of firms receiving the credit has no impact on the
expected net benefit of the public support for R&D. As discussed below, lowering the regular
SR&ED credit rate to 15 percent slightly reduces the net public benefit from the subsidy. 
TABLE 1: COSTING OF INNOVATION INITIATIVES IN BUDGET 2012 AND IMPACT BY SIZE OF FIRM
(millions of dollars)
1 The SME share of the SR&ED measures was calculated by considering the share of enhanced credit claims in
total claims as well as the relative importance of capital equipment, overhead and contracts in the spending of
SMEs and other firms.
Source: the 2012 federal budget and author's calculations.
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Reduction in Regular SR&ED Credit Rate -190 -285 -295 -295
Spending on capital equipment non-eligible -15 -40 -40 -10 -30
Tighten overhead proxy method -10 -55 -95 -100 -59 -41
Remove profits from eligible contract payments -25 -55 -60 -65 -21 -44
Total sources of funds -35 -315 -480 -500 -90 -410
SR&ED Enhancing Predictability 4 2
NRC-IRAP — additional funding 110 110 110 110 110 110
NRC — focus on demand driven research 67
Procurement — CICP 25 35 35 40 40
Western Innovation Program
Internships (IRDI - Mitacs) 7 7
Business-led Networks of Centres of Excellence 12 12 12 12 12 5 7
Forestry Innovation (and Market Development) 55 50
Subtotal — additional ongoing spending 255 206 157 157 162 155 7
Net Change 255 171 -158 -323 -338 65 -403
2016-7
2012-3 2013-4 2014-5 2015-6 All firms SMEs1 Other
Firms
OTHER SR&ED INITIATIVES
Most of the other changes to the SR&ED tax incentive program are sensible. For example,
reducing the generosity of the proxy method for calculating overhead expenses is a highly
appropriate change. Under current rules, firms are allowed to calculate overhead expenses
directly, or as 65 percent of salaries and wages of employees who are directly engaged in
SR&ED activities as a proxy for actual overhead expenses.1 The proxy calculation was
introduced to reduce compliance costs, but, as argued by the Jenkins Panel, it appears to be too
generous. In 2007, almost all firms used the proxy method.2 Given the amount of detail
required in the standard calculation, it is not surprising that most small firms make use of the
proxy method, but the fact that most large firms also use the alternative method suggests that it
is more generous than it needs to be.3 As noted by McKenzie4 this generosity biases the choice
of inputs by increasing the effective credit rate on labour. Eliminating the profit component
from eligible spending in contracted R&D will remove a source of bias in favour of contract
versus in-house R&D, since profits are not an eligible expense for in-house R&D.
Under current rules, spending on capital equipment used to undertake R&D, but not spending
on buildings,5 is eligible for a tax credit and can be deducted from taxable income in the year
the cost is incurred. Removing spending on capital equipment from the tax incentive program
will reduce the benefit received by firms, but this reduction will be partially offset by the lower
compliance costs associated with a simpler applications process. Simplification will also
reduce administration expenses. Given that equipment accounts for less than five percent of
eligible spending, the impact on administration and compliance costs will be small. Further, as
pointed out by McKenzie,6 removal of capital spending from the credit base will hurt
efficiency by distorting the choice of inputs and by placing equipment-intensive R&D at a
disadvantage. Overall, eliminating capital equipment as an eligible expenditure is likely to
make the SR&ED credit less rather than more efficient.
The Jenkins Panel recommended that the CRA improve its pre-claim project review service in
order to provide firms with more predictable qualification for the credit. More specifically, the
Panel recommended implementing a formal pre-approval process. Firms can now obtain an
informal ruling on eligibility from the CRA, but the Panel made the case that a formal ruling
would be of more benefit to firms by removing eligibility risk when assessing the value of the
credit. In particular, more firms would be able to apply for loans using the credit as security
and the cost of hiring third parties to prepare claims would decline along with eligibility risk.
The government has accepted this recommendation, announcing measures to improve
predictability of access and a pilot study to determine the feasibility of implementing a formal
approval process.
1 Overhead expenses comprise salaries and wages of support staff; office supplies; general-purpose office equipment
and furniture; heat, water, electricity and telephone; travel and training; property taxes; and maintenance and upkeep
of SR&ED premises, facilities and equipment.
2 Review of Federal Support to Research and Development — Expert Panel Report Innovation Canada: A Call to
Action Publishing and Depository Services, Public Works and Government Services Canada, Ottawa, 2011 page 6-11. 
3 It is highly likely that large firms calculate overhead expenses by both methods and choose the method that provides
the largest benefit.
4 Kenneth J. McKenzie “The Big and the Small of Tax Support for R&D in Canada,” School of Public Policy
Research Paper Volume 5 Issue 22. 2012.
5 Note that special purpose structures such as clean rooms may qualify as equipment.
6 Kenneth J. McKenzie op cit. supra, note 4.
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The government also announced that it will study contingency fees charged by tax preparers.7
The concern is that high contingency fees may be diminishing the benefits of the tax credit to
both firms and the overall economy. This concern may be misplaced, particularly if the
government is able to increase predictability. Small firms likely view contingent fees as a form
of insurance against eligibility risk, as well as a method of improving cash flow. In addition,
abstracting from illegal behaviour, firms preparing applications on a contingent fee basis have
less incentive to spend time on claims that may not be eligible than firms preparing claims on
an hourly basis. Overall, contingent fees likely improve the cost-effectiveness of the SR&ED
credit, but their use is likely to decline as predictability of access improves. 
INCREASED FUNDING FOR IRAP 
The budget announced a doubling of the Industrial Research Assistance Program (IRAP)
funding to about $220 million a year. IRAP provides funding for R&D undertaken by firms
with up to 500 employees. The program is held in high esteem by users and foreign
governments. There is, nevertheless, a need to take a second look at the IRAP model of
providing firms with a substantial amount of one-on-one advice and imposing relatively
burdensome reporting requirements. The most recent publicly available information indicates
that prior to 2009, adjusted8 administration costs of IRAP amounted to almost 25 cents per
dollar of assistance provided.9 Compliance costs are also relatively high at about 11½ cents per
dollar of funding assistance received.10 The sum of compliance and adjusted administration
costs is about 33 percent of benefits received, compared to about 17 percent for the enhanced
SR&ED credit. 
CHANGES TO OTHER INNOVATION PROGRAMS
The budget also announced increased funding and permanent status for the Canadian
Innovation Commercialization Program (CICP), as well as additional funding for risk capital
financing. Both of these programs are targeted at SMEs. An additional $400 million will be
made available to promote private sector investment in early-stage, or seed, risk capital and to
support the development of large-scale venture capital funds led by the private sector. This
approach follows in broad outline the recommendations of the Jenkins Panel. 
7 Many accounting firms will prepare SR&ED applications for a fee, often expressed as a percentage of the value of
the claim, that is contingent on a successful claim. Under this arrangement, the accounting firm absorbs all of the risk
of an unsuccessful claim.  
8 Adjusted administration expenses are calculated assuming that management and technical advice provided to client
firms is part of the assistance provided to firms. Without this adjustment, administration expenses amount to 37
percent of assistance provided to firms. The calculation is based on data provided in NRC-IRAP 2007 Impact
Evaluation of the NRC Industrial Research Assistance Program — Final Report, which can be requested on line
from NRC-IRAP. 
9 The high administration expenses also reflect IRAP’s substantial regional presence and the provision of services to
other programs without recovering all costs.
10 John Lester, “Benefit-Cost Analysis of R&D Support Programs,” mimeo, 2012, page 15. Available at:
http://accounting.uwaterloo.ca/tax-conference/Tax_Policy_Research_Symposium_2012.html
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The Panel identified two gaps in the risk capital funding chain. Innovative startups have
difficulty getting financing because it is difficult for outsiders to assess the quality of both the
technology and managers. More resources have to be devoted to due diligence when investing
in innovative startups than when investing in other startups, and lenders try to shift more of the
risk to the entrepreneur through high collateral requirements, both of which reduce the flow of
financing to innovative startups. In addition to these theoretical observations, the Panel’s report
notes that rates of return to angel investor groups in the US are substantially higher than for the
next stage in the funding chain, venture capital financing.11 These relatively high rates of return
suggest the existence of excess demand for seed capital, although the observed difference could
be the result of a higher risk premium on angel capital financing. Given that angel investing is
even less advanced in Canada than in the US, the Panel concluded that a financing gap likely
exists in Canada as well.
The second gap identified by the Panel is in later-stage venture capital financing, which
supplies firms that have revenues but are not yet profitable. This is a surprising finding given
the low rates of return in the venture capital industry,12 which point to either an excess supply
of capital or poor management of existing funds. The more subtle point made by the Panel is
that the relatively small scale of Canadian venture capital funds hurts returns, in part by
spreading fixed costs over a smaller base, and in part by making it more difficult to follow
firms from early stage to exit, which allows foreign firms to dominate the more profitable later-
stage venture capital stage. This situation does not provide convincing evidence of a financing
gap since foreign sources may be providing sufficient supply. Recognizing this point, the Panel
report argues that even in the absence of a financing gap, full participation by domestic firms
would result in greater benefits to Canada, largely because domestically financed firms are
more likely to stay in Canada.
The government is now considering how to structure the additional support. The first step
should be to eliminate the federal tax credit for investment in Labour-Sponsored Venture
Capital Corporations (LSVCCs), which would recover about $130 million in forgone tax
revenues. There is convincing evidence that LSVCCs have earned low returns and crowded out
private funds to the detriment of the overall venture capital industry.13 While performance
could undoubtedly be enhanced by setting more tightly focused mandates and improving
governance, performance will remain relatively poor because of the incentives created by the
near-perfect separation of ownership by small retail investors and control by professional
managers.14 This structure also makes LSVCCs more costly than necessary. 
11 The Panel report (page 7-15) cites returns of 27 percent for angel investor groups and 18.3 percent on overall venture
capital investments.  
12 The Canadian Venture Capital Association reports that the rate of return on private independent venture capital funds
averaged one percent over the three years ending in mid-2011; 0.2 percent over a five-year horizon and -3.1 percent
over a 10-year horizon. See a CVCA news release “Performance Data – Private Independent Funds,” dated
December 13, 2011.
(http://www.cvca.ca/files/News/Q2_11_CVCA_Performance_Public_Release_Private_Independent.pdf ) 
13 See Jeffrey G. MacIntosh “Tantalus Unbound: Government Policy and Innovation in Canada,” School of Public
Policy Research Paper Volume 5 Issue 8, March 2012, pp. 5-9.
14 Ibid pp. 3-4.
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Instead of subsidizing supply by many small retail investors, the government should structure
incentives to encourage the participation of industry professionals in joint public-private funds.
In order to attract private funding, the government could cap its return at its cost of borrowing,
while accepting the possibility of losing some or all of its capital. This approach provides
private investors with a leveraged return: they face the same risk of loss, but because the
government return is capped, private investors have a higher upside. An important advantage of
this approach is that fund managers have an incentive to work closely with entrepreneurs,
because they get all of the benefit from returns higher than the government’s target return. As
noted by the Panel, variants of this approach have been successfully applied in the US, the UK,
Israel, New Zealand and Russia. 
The private participants in the fund would have the right incentives to invest wisely — their
own money is at risk— so the cost to the government can be kept low. In fact, if private
investors make the investment decisions, if the government can resist the temptation to impose
regional and sectoral performance requirements on the fund managers and if the LSVCC tax
credit is eliminated, it would be perfectly reasonable to assume that over the longer term, the
government will get a return equal to its cost of borrowing. There would still be a cost from
administering the fund, but these costs could be kept low by having the Business Development
Bank of Canada (BDC) administer the fund, as recommended by the Jenkins Panel. Based on
the cost of running BDC’s venture capital program, these costs are likely to be around five
percent of the government contribution to the fund. Assuming 50 percent private sector
participation, the cost per dollar of financing provided would be 2.5 cents.
ASSESSMENT OF CHANGES TO SR&ED AND IRAP 
Most of the announced changes to innovation programs were inspired by the recommendations
of the Jenkins Panel. An important exception is the reduction in support for large firms. The
Jenkins Panel recommended scaling back the enhanced credit to finance increases in direct
programs that would be more effective in raising the number of small innovative firms that
become global competitors. The Panel raised two concerns about existing levels of support for
innovative SMEs. First, only a small number of the approximately 18,000 SMEs receiving the
enhanced credit will grow into large, successful firms, which makes the credit a blunt
instrument for supporting the gazelles among the many recipients. Second, the Panel expressed
concern that public support for R&D undertaken by SMEs may be so high that the costs of the
subsidy exceed the benefits. 
A key reason for the concern about excessive subsidization is that, in addition to the federal tax
credit, firms undertaking R&D can take advantage of provincial tax assistance, which raises the
average credit rate to 25 percent for large firms and to 43.6 percent for SMEs.15 As a result,
Canada provides the most generous level of tax assistance to SMEs undertaking R&D in a 
15 Calculated as the weighted sum of federal plus provincial statutory credit rates in each province, using provincial
shares of business enterprise spending on R&D as weights. Note that provincial assistance is excluded from the base
for calculating the federal credit. 
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comparison group of countries comprising all members of the Organisation for Economic Co-
Operation and Development, Brazil, Russia, India, China, Hong Kong and Singapore.16
Canadian SMEs also have access to direct assistance programs (e.g., the federal Industrial
Research Assistance Program, or IRAP) offered by the federal and provincial governments. In
2007, approximately a quarter of firms receiving the enhanced federal SR&ED tax credit
received financial assistance amounting to 45-50 percent of their spending on R&D and
roughly nine percent of the total, about 1600 firms, received assistance amounting to more than
50 percent of their R&D spending.17
16 See John Lester and Jacek Warda “Modifying the B-index to Improve International Comparisons of Tax Assistance
for Investment in R&D,” mimeograph 2012, available on request from the author. Only six countries in the
comparison group provide more generous tax incentives for SMEs than for larger firms.
17 Review of Federal Support to Research and Development — Expert Panel Report op cit. supra, note 2 pp. 6-9.
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Box 1: The Benefit-Cost Approach to Program Evaluation
The benefit-cost approach focuses on
what should be the ultimate objective of
government support for R&D — higher
real income — and therefore provides a
basis for comparing programs and
determining how program effectiveness
could be enhanced by reallocating
funding. Governments provide support for
R&D because the private market fails to
provide the socially optimal amount of
investment. This market failure arises
because, despite their best efforts and
the benefits of patent protection, firms
cannot prevent the knowledge gained
through their R&D from leaking out, or
spilling over, to other firms. 
Providing financial support to firms that
undertake R&D is therefore in the
interest of all Canadians because, to the
extent that this assistance results in
additional R&D, it will contribute to a
higher standard of living for all citizens.
But intervening in the economy has
costs, so support programs have to be
carefully designed to realize a net
economic benefit. 
The largest cost of supporting R&D
arises from the need to raise taxes to
finance the assistance provided to firms.
Higher taxes hurt economic efficiency
through adverse effects on incentives to
work, save and invest. Analysis
undertaken by Dahlby and Feredea
indicates that raising an extra dollar of
tax revenue reduces economic efficiency
by about 26 cents. Administering and
applying for the subsidies absorb
resources that could be used elsewhere,
which adds to the cost of providing the
assistance. For example, SMEs incur, on
average, about 14 cents in compliance
costs for each dollar of tax benefits
received from the enhanced SR&ED
credit.
Finally, government support for a specific
activity hurts economic efficiency by
shifting labour and capital from their
best uses. A more intuitive way to look
at this issue is to note that with
government assistance, projects with a
below-market private rate of return
become viable and that the lower return
represents a loss in economic output. In
other words, government support shifts
investment from activities where it earns
a competitive private return to activities
where it earns a lower rate of return, and
this puts downward pressure on the net
economic benefit from supporting R&D.
As a result, everything else being equal,
rising subsidy rates result in a lower net
economic benefit, reflecting lower
private returns.
a. Bev Dahlby and Ergete Ferede 2011 The
Effects of Tax Rate Changes on Tax
Bases and the Marginal Cost of Public
Funds for Provincial Governments. Online
Working Paper. Toronto: C.D. Howe
Institute. 
A preliminary benefit-cost analysis undertaken for the Jenkins Panel indicated that the
enhanced SR&ED credit “likely does not generate a positive net benefit because of the high
subsidy rate and compliance costs relative to the spillover benefit.”18 (See Box 1 for a
description of the benefit-cost approach to evaluating programs.) Further analysis has
confirmed that the enhanced credit fails a benefit-cost test for the reasons noted by the Panel,
while the regular credit generates a net economic benefit.19 Firms claiming the enhanced credit
incur compliance costs amounting to about 14 cents per dollar of credit claimed, compared to
just under five percent for firms accessing the regular credit.20 But even if compliance (and
administration) costs were the same for both the enhanced and regular credits, the enhanced
credit would still show a net loss, because the credit rate is well above the rate that maximizes
the net benefit and the extra support available from other federal and provincial programs
drives the net benefit more deeply into negative territory. The benefit-cost analysis indicates
that the optimal rate for the regular credit is approximately 20 percent, while the loss
associated with the enhanced credit would be minimized with a rate of about 15 percent,
reflecting the impact of substantially higher compliance costs.
The various tightening measures announced in the federal budget reduce the effective credit
rates for both large and small firms (see the Annex for details). The changes to the regular
credit reduce the effective rate further below the optimal rate, causing the net benefit to fall
about $40 million (Table 2). In contrast, the tightening measures in the budget reduce the
effective rate for the enhanced credit closer to its optimal rate, so the net benefit rises. Overall,
the budget measures marginally reduce the net benefit from the SR&ED program. The benefit-
cost results suggest that a more effective policy change would have been to leave the statutory
rate for the regular credit unchanged and reduce the enhanced credit rate to 20 percent: with
this policy, the net benefit for the overall program would have been $115 million higher.
TABLE 2: BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS OF SR&ED AND IRAP
(millions of dollars)
1 Funding levels are for 2007 for SR&ED and 2009 for IRAP, which is doubled for the post-budget analysis.
18 Ibid pp. 6-12.
19 John Lester op cit. supra, note 10.
20 Expert Review Panel on Research and Development Assessing the Scientific Research and Experimental
Development Tax Credit page 9. Web publication: http://rd-review.ca/eic/site/033.nsf/vwapj
/4_Assessing_the_SRED_Tax_Credit-eng.pdf/$FILE/4_Assessing_the_SRED_Tax_Credit-eng.pdf
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Assistance provided to firms1 1958 1298 3256 93/186
Net Benefit
Pre-Budget 205 -185 20 -12
Post-Budget 165 -155 10 -18
Budget Impact -40 30 -10 -6
Single 20% rate 195 -90 105
SR&ED
IRAP
Regular Credit Enhanced Credit Combined
The benefit-cost analysis of IRAP indicates that the program is generating a net economic loss,
despite the assumption that the spillover benefits associated with IRAP-sponsored projects are
greater than for SR&ED projects.21 The main reason for this outcome is administration and
compliance costs that sum to about a third of the assistance provided to firms. While there are
some economies of scale in administering the program, doubling funding for IRAP without any
changes to the basic approach to delivering assistance increases the net loss. 
The benefit-cost analysis does not include any administration and compliance cost savings
arising from the elimination of capital equipment from eligible spending. Nor do they include
the benefits from improvements in CRA’s pre-claim service, which could be substantial,
particularly if a formal pre-approval process is set up. Finally, the results do not include the
negative effects arising from the distortions to input use and choice of firm size emphasized by
McKenzie.22
Taken at face value, the benefit-cost results suggest that real income would rise if the enhanced
credit were eliminated, or scaled back to provide the same benefits as for large firms. There
are, however, a number of benefits from supporting small firms that are not captured in the
benefit-cost analysis, so some caution in drawing conclusions about the effectiveness of extra
support for small firms is warranted.
A frequently made argument is that providing an enhanced SR&ED tax credit for R&D
undertaken by innovative startups is justified because of the financing constraints faced by
such firms. The existence of financing constraints is a strong argument in favour of
refundability, but providing a higher credit rate to deal with a capital market imperfection will
be less cost-effective than implementing measures that deal directly with the market failure.
The government has a number of programs in place to mitigate the financing problems of
innovative firms and announced additional funding for risk capital financing in Budget 2012. If
funding for these programs is still inadequate, it should be increased and the enhanced credit
should be evaluated on its ability to generate a net benefit by subsidizing investment in R&D.
Another argument made for providing additional support for small firms undertaking R&D is
that social benefits in addition to knowledge spillovers are realized when young innovative
firms become large successful enterprises. While this argument has merit, it is easy to overstate
the social benefits from nurturing innovative firms. The owners of the growing firm clearly
profit from expansion, and the employees may receive higher wages as well, but the existence
of a benefit for the broader economy depends on the ability of firms to generate unusually high
profits (i.e. rents) on export sales,23 which raise national income; taxation of these rents
benefits society generally and therefore justifies government support. Note that in the absence
of export sales, rents earned by owners and employees of the growing firm represent a transfer
of income among Canadians, not additional national income.
21 Based on an extensive review of the empirical literature, spillovers from projects subsidized by the generally
available SR&ED investment tax credit are set at 56 percent of the R&D undertaken. IRAP sponsors projects that
are, on average, “further from the market,” and generate spillovers of 76 percent. See Lester op cit. supra note 10 for
additional details. 
22 Kenneth J. McKenzie op cit. supra, note 4.
23 There would also be a social benefit if strong export demand allowed workers in the growing firm to earn rents that
generate additional tax revenue. 
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In order to rigorously assess the argument, the marginal social benefit in the form of extra tax
revenue on export sales should be compared to the marginal cost of the additional benefit
provided to small firms. Determining the marginal social benefit requires the following
information:
• The number of additional startups induced by the extra support;
• The number of these additional startups that make the transition to large successful firms, or
that become part of larger firms through a merger or acquisition; and 
• The timing and the size of the rents earned on export sales by these successful firms.
This information is not, to say the least, readily available. But an estimate of the marginal
social cost of providing additional assistance to small firms is available from the benefit-cost
analysis: the marginal social cost of raising the refundable credit from 20 to 35 percent is about
$65 million a year,24 assuming that the additional support is financed by a share-weighted
increase in all taxes. On the other hand, if the source of financing is higher corporate income
taxes, the marginal social cost could be as much as $375 million, which is a more substantial,
but perhaps not insurmountable, hurdle.25
It is, however, worth bearing in mind that the benefit-cost estimates are based on the
assumption that spillovers are the same for large and small firms. While there is an extensive
empirical literature on spillovers, there is only one study that provides evidence on spillovers
by size of firm. Bloom, Schankerman and Van Reenen26 find that spillovers decline with firm
size because smaller firms operate in technological niches that limit the scope for spillovers.
Specifically, the authors find that spillovers are 55 percent lower for firms in the bottom size-
quartile than for firms in the top quartile. This finding did not influence the choice of
parameter values in the benefit-cost analysis, in part because only publicly listed firms in the
US are included in the analysis; as a result, firms in the bottom size-quartile (less than 500
employees) are likely to be larger on average than the firms making use of IRAP and the
enhanced SR&ED credit. Small firms may have more difficulty formally protecting their
intellectual property27 than larger firms and employees may be more mobile, which is an
important source of knowledge spillovers; these considerations suggest that there may be an
offset to the niche effect on spillovers for small firms. Nevertheless, the Bloom, Schankerman
and van Reenen study suggests that the estimated net benefits from the enhanced SR&ED tax
credit and IRAP may be too high, making it more difficult to argue that providing additional
support for innovative startups provides a net social benefit.
24 The $65 million cost is the difference between -155 and -90 in Table 2.
25 Dahlby and Ergete estimate that raising one dollar of additional tax revenue reduces economic efficiency by 26 cents
if all taxes are increased but the cost rises to 71 cents if the source of financing is higher corporate income taxes.
See Box 1.
26 Bloom, Nicholas, Mark Schankerman and John Van Reenen “Identifying technology spillovers and product market
rivalry,” Stanford University mimeo 2012.
27 Smaller firms may not be able to use patents or complementary technologies to protect their intellectual property as
effectively as larger firms, which would cause spillovers to be higher for the small firms undertaking R&D. 
10
CONCLUSION
The federal government has made a number of sensible changes to the SR&ED tax incentive
program. Tightening up on the proxy method of calculating overhead expenses and contract
payments will improve the efficiency of the SR&ED tax credit. Improving predictability of
eligibility for the credit will have an important impact on compliance costs and the
effectiveness of the enhanced credit. On the other hand, the decision to reduce the regular
credit from 20 to 15 percent will have a small negative impact on the net benefit generated by
the credit. Furthermore, the budget slightly increases support for innovative SMEs from levels
that are so high that there is considerable risk that the taxpayers footing the bill are no longer
getting value for their money. A more prudent strategy would have been to give all firms a
similar level of tax assistance, while providing additional direct support for SMEs to help
mitigate financing constraints and to improve their ability to commercialize their R&D, as was
recommended by the Jenkins Panel.    
The federal government launched in late June consultations on how the $400 million in
additional funding for risk capital should be delivered. The government would do well to bear
in mind that returns in the venture capital industry are very low and that the additional funding
is unlikely to be successfully deployed until returns improve. Eliminating the tax credit for
investment in LSVCCs is an essential first step in restoring the financial health of the venture
capital industry.  
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ANNEX: STATUTORY AND EFFECTIVE SR&ED INVESTMENT TAX CREDIT RATES
The Annex provides detail on the effective SR&ED investment tax credit rates used in the
benefit-cost analysis. 
The pre-budget effective rate for the regular credit is lower than the 20 percent statutory rate,
primarily because of delays in claiming the credit. Firms do not always have sufficient taxable
income in order to claim the credit as it is earned and delays in claiming the credit lower its
present value. The exclusion of buildings also reduces the effective credit rate. On the other
hand, a case can be made that the simplified method of calculating overhead expenses and the
inclusion of the profit component in contract research increase eligible spending above actual
spending, which raises the effective credit rate. For the enhanced credit, the latter two features
dominate the impact of excluding capital spending, so the pre-budget effective credit rate is
slightly higher than the statutory rate.
ANNEX TABLE A: SR&ED INVESTMENT TAX CREDIT RATES (in %)
1 Assumes that the revised calculations announced in Budget 2012 closely approximate actual overhead costs and the
profit component of contract R&D.
2 Effective January 2014, except for the change to contracts, which is effective January 2013.
3 The adjustments for delayed claims and the exclusion for buildings become smaller with a lower statutory rate.
Source: Expert Review Panel on Research and Development Assessing the 
Scientific Research and Experimental Development Tax Credit op cit. supra, note 20 and author's calculations.   
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Current System
Statutory rate 35.0 20.0
Adjustment for present value of delayed claims 0.0 -3.0
Exclusion of buildings from eligible expenditures -1.7 -1.0
Excess benefit from simplified overhead expenses calculation1 1.5 0.5
Excess benefit from including profit component in eligible contract expenses1 0.9 0.7
Effective credit rate 35.7 17.2
Budget 2012 Changes2
Statutory rate change 0.0 -5.0
Exclude equipment from eligible expenditures -0.9 -0.6
Eliminate excess benefit from simplified overhead expenses calculation -1.5 -0.3
Eliminate excess benefit from including profit component in eligible contract expenses -1.0 -0.5
Interaction effects with pre-budget adjustments3 0.7
Effective credit rate 32.3 11.5
Enhanced Credit Regular Credit
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